



EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO CBRNE INCIDENTS

Directive: 13 – 104

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I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Directive is to provide guidance with identifying and responding to a possible CBRNE incident by implementing strategic and tactical guidelines.

II. POLICY

All members of DGS-MCP will strictly adhere to the procedures set forth in this Directive.

III. DEFINITION

CBRNE

Chemical
Biological
Radiological
Nuclear
Explosive

IV. PROCEDURES

A. Pre-Incident/Incident Plans and Procedures

1. The ability of an agency to respond to and effectively manage any emergency incident begins with departmental plans, procedures, and training. It is also important each incident be handled uniformly every time. Uniformity is necessary so effortless communication and planning can be made with allied emergency response agencies as they rely heavily on each other to successfully manage an incident,
2. This Directive is designed as a reference guide for the initial response of CBRNE acts. Although it will specifically guide the officer, keep in mind different situations may call for different responses. Not all reactions to catastrophes will go according to plan. The first responder should always use their best judgment.
3. As a rule DGS-MCP will not respond to a chemically hazardous environment without the proper training, equipment and support from allied agencies. Several recommendations are made throughout this Directive regarding roles, levels of operation, and personal protective equipment (PPE).

B. Assessing Vulnerabilities

1. Operations Security (OPSEC)

- a. Identification of Critical Information: The identification of critical information (information that is vitally needed by an adversary) is important in that it focuses the remainder of the OPSEC process on protecting vital information, rather than attempting to protect all classified or sensitive unclassified information.
- b. Analysis of Threats: This action involves the research and analysis of intelligence, counterintelligence, and open source information to identify who the likely adversaries are in the planned operation.
- c. Analysis of Vulnerabilities: This action involves examining each aspect of the planned operation to identify OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information and then comparing those indicators with the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities identified in the previous action
- d. Assessment of Risk: First, planners analyze the vulnerabilities identified in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC measures for each vulnerability. Second, specific OPSEC measures are selected for execution based upon a risk assessment done by the commander and staff.
- e. Application of Appropriate OPSEC Measures: The command implements the OPSEC measures selected in the assessment of risk action or, in the case of planned future operations and activities, includes the measures in specific OPSEC plans.
- f. Additionally, an OPSEC assessment is an intensive application of the OPSEC process to an existing operation or activity by a multidiscipline team of experts. Assessments are essential for identifying requirements for additional OPSEC measures and for making necessary changes in existing OPSEC measures.
- g. DGS-MCP should conduct annual threat assessment of all facilities. It should include an accurate and realistic assessment of the likelihood of CBRNE incidents, the potential targets, and the resulting impact on the public and infrastructure. During this assessment the OPSEC process should be followed. Additional consideration should be given to the adequacy of personnel training and inventory of equipment.

C. Intelligence Sharing

1. Intelligence information is one of the most important aspects of law enforcement operations in preventing criminal and terrorist events. Information gathering and tracking of individuals suspected of possible criminal intent are key to providing a safer community for our citizens to live in. There should be one or more investigators or officers dedicated to corresponding with allied agencies to keep updated on current threats of terrorism. Discretion should always be used when sharing intelligence information.

D. Training

1. Personal Protective Equipment: The response to any emergency incident relies on both manpower and resources. CBRNE incidents require properly trained and properly equipped personnel respond to these incidents. DGS-MCP currently has only Level C protection which includes: full face negative pressure respirators with Chem. Biowarfare filters, Tyvek body suits with hoods and rubber gloves and boots. This set-up will allow the officer to maintain a position in the cold zone or, on a temporary basis, in the *warm* zone depending on the incident.
2. Terrorists Threats: All personnel will receive updated training as necessary in reference to current threats. Support Services will generate bulletins or memos as needed and disseminate to DGS-MCP.

E. Predetermination of Off-Site Casualty Relocation Center

1. Any CBRNE attack can produce an enormous number of casualties that can overload a community's healthcare system. Not all chemical agents are quick acting or result in immediate casualties or fatalities. It can be anticipated that some victims will leave the scene contaminated and attempt to seek medical care on their own. All victims should be advised to stay at the location of the incident to avoid spreading contamination. Most hospitals will not be able to manage the vast number of victims from a large scale CBRNE incident.

F. Equipment Resources

1. All equipment should be inspected and kept updated as required and supplies be replenished upon immediate use of these items. Any equipment found unserviceable or defective should be taken out of service and replaced.

a. Equipment

- Individual PPE
- Rubber gloves
- Duct tape
- Rubber boots
- Negative Pressure Respirator
- Tyvek suits

b. Detachment Initial Response Kit

- Crime scene tape
- Pens
- Pencils
- Field Interview Notebooks
- Whistles
- Bleach (decontaminating equipment)

Flares
Property reports (chain of custody forms)
Soap
Water
Clear plastic bags
First Aid kit

G. Responding To CBRNE Incident

1. Police Communication Operator

- a. PCO's are the eyes and ears of the responders until they arrive at the incident scene. Properly trained and equipped dispatchers are crucial to the outcome of this incident. PCO's need to be trained to recognize information that indicated a CBRNE event has occurred.

This should be done by asking the caller the following questions:

- What type of emergency do you have?
- Caller's name
- Caller's location
- Caller's telephone number
- Location of the emergency
- What type of complex (Multi-Service Center complexes)
- Is there a fire or was there an explosion?
- What type of vehicle, container or device was involved?
- Has anything spilled?
- Do you see smoke or a vapor cloud?
- Do you hear a bursting or hissing sound?
- Has anyone complained about an unusual odor?
- Are there are victims? How many?
- What are the victims' complaints?
- Weather conditions at the scene

- b. Responsibilities:

- (1) Gather information from all resources assigned to this incident
- (2) Dispatch responders
- (3) Notification to allied agencies if asked to do so

2. Responding Officers

- a. Officers should keep in mind the basic training they have received for these types of incidents. The patrol officer is expected to operate primarily on the outer

perimeter (cold zone) of the contaminated area and should encounter little or no contamination. Officers are reminded that biological agents may produce delayed reactions and inhalation is the primary route of entry for biological and chemical agents.

b. Initial Approach

1. Has there been any current threat known or received?
 - If yes, what was targeted (people, property, or both)?
2. Implement personal protective measures, as needed
3. Confirm wind direction and approach upwind:
 - Chemical and biological agents can enter the body through inhalation or skin absorption

c. Primary Observations

1. Identify damaged and affected areas
 - Chemical clouds
 - Destroyed buildings
 - Unusual odors
 - Dead wildlife
 - Types of Injuries

2. Look for the method of dispersement

d. Determine life/safety threats of

- Self
- Responders
- Victims
- Public

e. Initial Triage prior to arrival of Fire and Rescue Units, if safe to do so remove from contaminated area

- Are there unconscious victims with minimal or no trauma?
- Are there victims that are having seizures?
- Is there blistering or reddening of the skin?
- Are the victims having difficulty breathing?
- Interview victims and witnesses if possible
- Basic information should include: name, DOB, chief complaint
- Who was involved?
- Did they smell, see, taste, hear, or feel anything out of the ordinary?
- Attempt to identify the type of event (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical)

- Prioritize the victim's needs (ambulatory or non-ambulatory)

f. Detaining affected persons

**The Legality of detaining someone intent on leaving the site that had not yet been decontaminated will depend on the following three conditions:*

- (1) The individual could be forcibly detained if there was reasonable cause to suspect that he or she was involved in carrying out the attack.
- (2) The threat of contaminating an area or person(s) outside the perimeter does not justify the use of force.
- (3) All attempts within legal limits should be used to convince individuals to undergo decontamination prior to departure from the incident scene.

3. Securing the Scene

- a. Isolate & deny entry except to essential personnel
- b. Evacuation of public from outer perimeter
- c. Avoid further contamination, DO NOT evacuate until the attack has been identified (shelter in place)
- e. Confine/contain contaminated and/or exposed victims
- f. Assist in transfer from rescue scene to crime scene

4. Investigation

- a. Interview as many people as possible (who, what, when, where, odors, tastes?)
- b. Identify type of event (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical)
- c. How many victims?
- d. Confiscated property and/or evidence shall be carefully and appropriately handled throughout the entire investigation. This would include the transferring of property to the FBI.

5. Establishing Command Centers

- a. The initial command center will be established by the on duty supervisor. The Command Center's location should have means to communicate with allied agencies and in the "cold zone". Additional duties of personnel assigned to the Center are:
 - (1) Ensure that all emergency contacts have been notified (See Appendix).
 - (2) Establish perimeters for *hot, warm, and cold zones*.
 - (3) Direct police personnel to established perimeter of cold zone and emergency evacuation routes, (level C protections is recommended for all officers manning this perimeter)
 - (4) Controlling all officer posts.
 - (5) Turning over command to the Senior Fire Official upon their arrival.
 - (6) Ensuring smooth transition from emergency response scene to criminal investigation scene

H. Suicide Bombers

1. Suicide Bombers / Person(s) With Bomb

- a. The National Homeland Security Department has advised that historical landmarks in the United States may be targeted for suicide bombings.
- b. Captured terrorist training manuals describe special operations as having three integrated stages, to include research (reconnaissance and/or surveillance) stage, planning stage and execution stage.
- c. They may also use techniques to test and probe security procedures and responses. Surveillance teams will attempt to ascertain the number of people inside a facility, number and location of security posts within the facility, names of important people within the facility, number of floors and rooms within the facility and if inside parking is available at the facility.

2. Police Communication Operator

- a. The main responsibility of the dispatcher is to monitor the status of the officer(s) and to record any vital information received.
- b. It is also their responsibility to dispatch back-up officers and make notifications to allied agencies.

3. Responding Officers

- a. The officers should be familiar with the following characteristics of a suspicious person with a bomb.
 - (1) Inappropriate clothing for weather, social position or location
 - (2) Oversized backpacks or tote bags that have excessive weight
 - (3) Not of American descent
 - (4) Loner
 - (5) Moves quickly but not running
 - (6) Eyes are focused on a particular area and vigilant
 - (7) Nervous
 - (8) Keeps hands in his pockets
 - (9) Pale face from recent shaving of beard
 - (10) Just prior to detonation, suspect will place his hands and head close to the bomb to obliterate post mortem identification
- b. Officer should scan the immediate area around the suspicious person for additional suspects and then follow this protocol.
 - (1) Make contact with Police Communications

- (2) Provide detailed location and description of suspect
- (3) Back up officers will immediately be dispatched
- (4) Backup will create a parameter keeping vehicles and pedestrians away from the location.
- (5) Backup will not approach interviewing officer and suspect until the proper signal is given.
- (6) Security Officers will act as the eyes and ears for law enforcement and will not approach the suspect.

c. Make contact with the suspect

- (1) Call or shout a voice command from a distance to break the suspect's concentration.
- (2) Make physical contact with the suspect to distract his attention and physically impede his forward movement
- (3) Insure physical control before questioning, especially of hands and arms
- (4) Ask basic questions (Field Interview)

d. Existing Bomb

- (1) Give the "signal" for backup officers if you suspect a bomb. The official signal for this incident will be to cross/fold *your* arms over chest *and maintain this position.*
- (2) Back-up officers who are in (the area) will see this sign and notify the officer in charge of the scene. Back-up officers will not approach but maintain the perimeter.
- (3) Dispatchers will notify local fire and police along with the State Fire Marshall's office.
- (4) Back-up officers will ensure that the area remains clear of civilians and assist with evacuation if needed.
- (5) Back-up officers will search for additional explosives or other bombers. If a second attack is to occur it is likely to occur within 20 minutes of the first attack and to be carried out along an evacuation route of staging area.